ABSTRACT This article examines how China's rise and increasing tensions with Japan are portrayed by South Korean bloggers. The deterioration in relations between China and Japan over the last two years generally projects onto the ways and means by which China's rise is portrayed in South Korea. Since Korea's relations with both its more populous neighbours have been historically fraught, and since it is also implicated in various territorial disputes with both countries, determining Korean sensibilities is an important way of gauging shifts in public opinion across the region. Although the conservative political establishments in both South Korea and Japan might see China as a constant threat, South Korean and Japanese netizens still popularly view each other with suspicion. By contrast, popular perceptions of the China threat in either country can be swayed by escalation of territorial disputes these two US allies still have with one another.
1 In other words, we are primarily interested to know how deterioration in relations between China and Japan might project on to the ways and means by which China's rise is portrayed in South Korea. Since Korea's relations with both its more populous neighbours have been historically fraught, and since it is also implicated in various territorial disputes with both countries, determining Korean sensibilities is an important way of gaging shifts in public opinion across the region. How does the flare-up of a regional territorial dispute like Senkaku/Diaoyu --in which South Korea is not implicated --affect popular South Korean perceptions of China and Japan? Which side is more likely to be seen as a rival, and whch side is framed as South Korea's friend as a result?
The Popular Dynamics of Chinese Nationalism
When the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) began its patriotic education campaigns in the 1990s, nationalism was conceived as a reliable source of much needed legitimacy and popular support. However, the volatile nature of popular nationalism, particularly the virulent strain evident in Chinese cyberspace, has created unforeseen pressures for the government.
The rise of popular nationalism has complicated the state's monopoly on foreign policy-2 For example, there are no articles in the official Renmin Ribao (People's Daily) that explicitly discuss the Tokdo and Diaoyu disputes in tandem. For an academic treatment, see Li and Qiu (2010) . making, for instance by challenging the strategy of "hide and bide" through the 1990s and early 2000s, which was incompatible with the stridency of popular opinion.
3 Popular nationalism is thus a double edged sword, both a source of legitimation for continued authoritarian rule, and "a means for the Chinese people to judge the performance of the state" (Zhao 2013: 541) . The party would prefer nationalism to be channelled and controlled like the regulated waters of a dam, but the strength of grassroots sentiments and the commercial imperatives that prevail in Chinese media and Chinese cyberspace make it difficult to turn on and off at will (Jiang 2012; Stockmann 2011) . Furthermore, nationalism is not the sole prerogative of the state, and in many cases it is led by commercial interests exploiting market demand: In the population at large and particularly in the comparatively free conditions that pertain in Chinese cyberspace, nationalism "sells". The world of online gaming provides an example of how state and commercial actors operate in cooperation to leverage popular demand. When the party accepted the popularity of gaming, particularly among the younger population, it seized on it as a pedagogical opportunity. Online games were declared "cultural products" and the state made substantial investments in the industry so that "patriotic online games became a joint enterprise between the Party-state and private companies" (Nie 2013: 508) . In combination, state and commercial interests were highly effective in inculcating popular nationalist sentiments, through online games like the War of Resistance series where players take on the role of various Chinese forces fighting against the Japanese occupiers in various bloody scenarios. Such games appear to be particularly popular among the "angry youth" (fenqing 愤青) that constitute one of the most stridently nationalistic cohorts. This demographic is also especially connected and active online (Sullivan 2014) , responsible for much of the mobilization that periodically spills over into physical world demonstrations.
Yet, despite the rapid growth of the Chinese internet population and fast-moving social media, the state has demonstrated the continuing capacity to contain popular nationalism. As Jessica Weiss (2014) and nationalization of the disputed islands in 2012, online and offline protests have been allowed to proceed.
Comparing anti-Japan protests over two decades, Reilly describes a cyclical pattern in which "a single inflammatory event can spread rapidly across a broad segment of the engaged public, stimulating online debates and activism that can spill over into the streets" (2013: np).
Although such grassroots mobilization may initially be tolerated by the state, and encouraged by commercial incentives related to a receptive public, the state's cost-benefit calculation changes over time. At the point that the state calculates that demonstrations may start to jeopardize domestic stability, long term foreign policy objectives, trade relations etc. the state's information control regime is engaged, controlling the tone of media coverage, censoring discussion and putting out counter-narratives (Reilly 2012) . Numerous scholars have noted how online and physical world protests can be useful in terms of a safety valve allowing people to blow off steam, as a feedback mechanism alerting authorities to how strongly the public feels about an issue, a tool in internal power competitions, in terms of signalling behaviour (Hasid 2012; Shen and Breslin 2010; Sullivan 2012; Weiss 2013 (Chen 1994; Zhang 1995 has over the past decade sparked an emotional response among nationalistic Koreans and heightened anti-Chinese sentiment in Korea. The claims to Goguryeo (also known as Koguryo) and Balhae are part of China's concerted effort to strengthen its historicalterritorial claims on its borders (Duara 1996; Townsend 1996; Wang, Q. 2001; Wang, Z. 2012 ) and also to allay its own internal security concerns (Chen 2012; Gries 2005) . This assertiveness has offended the vast majority of the South Korean public. Many in South Korea, especially the policy planning elite, fear that China's historical revisionism (the so-called "Northeast Project") is merely a smokescreen designed to establish historical claims to territory in North Korea in the same way that Tang Taizong used 'history'
to justify Tang occupation of Goguryeo territory (Shin 2012). For instance Bak Changhee of 5 This highly publicized and acrimonious dispute between China and Korea over ancient history is mirrored by an equally acrimonious disagreement over more recent history between Korea and Japan which receives treatment in Kimijima (2000) . 6 For excellent analyses of the dispute over ancient history between China and South Korea and the negative effects of nationalist indoctrination in both countries see Yi, S. (2001) and Yi, J. (2005) . 7 See http://bit.ly/1iqf3em, accessed September 26, 2013.
Gukbang University argues that China has traditionally viewed the Korean peninsula as its sphere of influence and will intervene to protect what it sees as its vested interests in North Korea (Park 2012: 221-2) . He also asserts that China's ultimate strategic goal is to expand its power further into the Korean peninsula, separate South Korea from its alliance with the US and establish a pro-Chinese government in the whole of the peninsula (Park 2012: 228) . Such fears of Chinese aggression must be taken into consideration when we examine Korean attitudes, especially academic attitudes towards the islands dispute between China and Japan. (Cha 2012; Yi 2007) .
The Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands Dispute in Korean Media and Blogs
The territorial dispute between Japan and China over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands has been followed with keen interest by the South Korean media, bloggers, and international relations experts, primarily because its peaceful resolution or violent implosion may have significant ramifications for possible future handlings by South Korea of its own territorial disputes with both Japan (Tokdo dispute) and China (Ieodo, Baekdusan and the Gando disputes). Korean attitudes concerning the dispute between China and Japan are very diverse ranging from those who express sympathy for China (usually those among the general public whose political sympathies are left-aligned or have strong anti-Japanese sentiments) to those who vouch for careful, guarded neutrality or advocate anti-Chinese and pro-Japanese policies (usually those who are on the right wing of the political spectrum and are hostile to China's perceived territorial ambitions in East Asia). These differing opinions and attitudes among Koreans are inseparably linked to Korea's historical relations with both countries, memories of which can still inflame nationalist sentiments within Korea. These historical memories of past grievances (directed at both Japan and China, but more so at Japan) when coupled with existing territorial disputes and economic and strategic concerns produce a very complex and varied reaction among the Korean public and academic community. All these aspects of the Korean reaction to and representation of the disputes between China and Japan will be explored below.
As noted earlier the majority of the Korean policy planning elite and international relations experts (who generally tend to be more conservative than the mass media and netizens) are more concerned about the present threat/pressure coming from China than about past historical grievances towards Japan. Many are of the opinion that Korea should, while maintaining a show of neutrality to avoid antagonising China, give support to the maintenance of the status quo with Japan in possession of the disputed islands, since an outright Chinese victory in the affair would lead to the domination by China of the vital sea lanes through which the majority of Korea's trade traffic and energy supplies pass through.
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However, the anti-Japanese sentiments generated by Japan's repeatedly provocative behaviour with regard to the Comfort Women issue and also the continuing Tokdo dispute with Japan made outright support for Japan in 2012 a very unappealing course of action for the Korean public in general. 9 The Korean media and internet bloggers repeatedly pointed out Japan's hypocrisy in claiming territory currently controlled by Korea, yet denying China's historical claims to territory controlled by Japan. In other words they suggested that Japan's position vis-à-vis China is similar to Korea's position in relation to Japan. This was often accompanied by the hope that the resolution of the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands dispute would be peaceful and yield useful precedents for Korea to utilise in its own territorial dispute with Japan 10 . Most of the Korean media 11 and bloggers 12 eventually adopted a semi-neutral stance, taking jibes at the Japanese for their double standards when it comes to territorial disputes, but not supporting China either since Korea is comfortable with neither China nor Japan.
Policy planners and academics in general advocated a careful, measured response to the dispute between Japan and China while making sure to pick up any developments that might 8 The more radical exponent of this view is Gang (2012) , however, there is a general wariness among the policy planning elite of South Korea about China's naval expansion in the East and South China Seas, which they feel can develop into a long term threat to Korea's economic and strategic interests. A strengthening of the alliance and cooperation with the US and Japan as a means of countering Chinese naval expansion is the dominant thinking among policy planners in Seoul (Jeong 2012) . 9 Anti-Japanese sentiment generated by yet another spat with Japan over Tokdo in 2012 shortly before the dispute over the Senkakus/Diaoyu flared up again between China and Japan, influenced the views of the South Korean mass media and also bloggers towards the dispute between China and Japan. 10 For instance, http://bit.ly/1is2KyF; http://bit.ly/1bqZjDg; http://bit.ly/1b21umr. Last viewed September 26, 2013. The reader commentaries/responses to this blog's neutral approach and call for moderation were positive, with all commentaries emphasizing the negative economic consequences for Korea should the situation escalate. 11 Every South Korean newspaper entry/editorial on the Senkaku-Diaoyu islands dispute prior to September 26 th 2013 has been accessed and analysed for the purposes of this article. 12 Similary every Korean blog which discussed the crisis prior to September 26 th 2013 has been accessed and analysed. Unfortunately there is simply no way of quantifying the extent to which these blogs and newspaper entries reflect Korean public opinion, since no polls were taken to determine accurately how the general public view the crisis and the belligerents involved. If however the representation in mass media (in this case newspapers and blogs) is taken as a reflection of the way in which the situation is presented to the Korean general public, their overall impact on public opinion is quite apparent. Therefore, a comprehensive analysis of these blogs, reader commentaries and newspapers is a useful exercise in assessing public opinion in the absence of concrete polling data. be of use in future negotiations with China and Japan over Korea's territorial disputes with both powers.
However, political divisions within Korea meant that there was as usual a pro-Chinese minority that attempted to utilize the anti-Japanese feeling in Korea and resulting sympathy, albeit brief, for China among the Korean public (as mentioned above largely due to anger towards Japan over Tokdo), to generally advance China's interests, which they view as matching their own political goals, that of advancing rapprochement with North Korea with Chinese aid and moving Korea out of America's sphere of influence (Gang and Park 2012) .
The left-aligned newspapers, bloggers and netizens in Korea, who traditionally favoured Communist China and appeasement of North Korea, therefore represented the islands dispute in a decidedly pro-Chinese light, casting the Japanese as imperialists who had stolen Chinese territory just as they now seek to steal Korean territory.
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Ohmy News, a radical left-wing newspaper, emphasized that Japan stole the islands from China while China was weak in the 19 th century and then held on to them with US aid. The Joongangilbo another conservative daily went as far as to claim that Japan's lurch to right is reaching dangerous levels and that Japan is on its way to developing a nuclear weapons program that is threatening to Korea. 21 However, in blogs associated with the paper China was also vehemently denounced for its arrogant attitude and territorial ambitions in the East China Sea, the ultimate goal of which, it was claimed, is to create a new tributary system in its favour in East Asia. 22 Other conservative or centre right newpapers tended to emphasize more the fact that this territorial dispute between China and Japan has the potential to also infringe on Korea's territorial claims and Exclusive Economic Zones in the south sea.
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Because of the similarities between this dispute and the Tokdo dispute between Korea and Japan the Korean blogosphere has featured some interesting commentaries on the issue.
Although it is difficult to quantify, at the ourbreak of the crisis in 2012 the dominant response to the dispute among Korean netizens who left comments on blogs and newspapers online, was support for China and hatred for Japan that was disputing Tokdo with Korea.
However, by the time bloggers started analysing the situation in detail the mood had palpably shifted somewhat . Some blogs placed the dispute within the context of other territorial disputes across East Asia mostly involving China and also Japan, and adopted a dispassionate commentary approach. 24 Some were even surprisingly hostile to China and accused the Chinese government of using the issue to hide internal problems and also justify its naval build-up which is a threat to Korea.
25
Still others advocated caution and warned against openly supporting China on the issue, despite dislike of Japan, because Korea's position vis-à-vis Japan on Tokdo is actually more similar to Japan's vis-à-vis China, than China's vis-à-vis Japan. If Japan were to lose the Senkakus on grounds proposed by China, Korea may be placed at a disadvantage, if disputes escalated over Tokdo with Japan, on those same grounds. Also people were reminded that Korea also has on-going territorial disputes with China as well. 26 Many were simply neutral on the issue, noting the huge economic and strategic benefits of controlling these islands which is driving both China and Japan to contest them, and advised that claims. 27 Some were however more emotive and expressed a common feeling of sorts with the Chinese because of Korea's problem with Japan on the Tokdo issue and advocated support for China on the issue.
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As time passed and disputes with China returned to the attention of Koreans, the initial warmth of Korean feeling towards China, which was perceived to be engaged in the same struggle as Korea against the aggressions of Japan, slowly but surely cooled and the majority of newpaper editorials and blogs (including reader commentaries) swung in the direction of caution and the urge to pick sides in the dispute quickly vanished. The advice of most bloggers and academic experts was to keep a level head, be alert about what the dispute will mean for Korea, and to think strategically for the national benefit. Korea as usual stuck in the middle between Japan and China has its share of pro-Japanese (less vocal) and proChinese (more vocal) advocates. However, the vast majority in the middle seem now to favour a much more nuanced and sensible approach to the dispute, which is in line with the caution displayed by the rest of the international community on the issue.
Socotra Rock: a Sino-Korean Bone of Contention
The dispute between China and South Korea over the Socotra Rock involves complex historical, nationalistic, territorial, administrative, economic, and defense issues. Interestingly, Socotra Rock remains relatively unknown to the outside world -including Japan. Indeed, one Japanese netizen has frankly admitted that Socotra Rock is "unfamiliar to [Japanese] Island (the nearest Japanese island is located only 275 kilometers away). Known in Korean as Ieodo (or Parangdo) and in Chinese as Suyan, it is not an island but a submerged coral reef which, at low tide, is 4.6 meters beneath the ocean's surface. Centuries-old Korean legends caution that sailors and fishermen who see the reef will never return home; the British merchant vessel, Socotra, which spotted the reef in 1900 (and which presumably remained ignorant of Korean legends) not only returned to London but also bestowed upon the reef its English-language name, Socotra Rock. It is difficult to characterize Japanese responses to this Sino-South Korea diplomatic row. Some have expressed surprise. "Territorial disputes are not only a Sino-Japanese and Korean-Japanese issue," commented the online news source, News U.S. 30 The vastly more reputable Newsweek carried an article with a similar sentiment; it noted that China's seemingly "endless" appetite encompassed "not just Okinawa" (Newsweek Japan 2013). Many Japanese bloggers tend to view the Changbai/Paekdu issue through the prism of territorial issues that involve Japan. One has asked whether any "demonstration movements"
(similar to those which bedevil Sino-Japanese relations) have arisen in China over the Changbai/Paekdu issue. Another concludes that the Chinese "make their own maps" and therefore dispute territory with virtually all of their neighbours, including Japan. Yet another states simply that the Chinese are the "same as a band of robbers." Having read these (and other) comments, another blogger concluded that China is bent on expansion, then veered away from the Changbai/Paekdu issue to note that Chinese citizens living in Japan may well be "preparing for an internal [Japanese] revolt" which would presumably assist China in its claims over the Senkaku Islands and even Okinawa Prefecture.
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Conclusion
Japan and South Korea are both wealthy industrial powerhouses that have much more in common with each other than with China, and are both strategically allied with the US. Yet, although the political establishments in both countries might see China as a constant threat, Korea and Japan still popularly view each other with suspicion. By contrast, popular perceptions of the China threat in either country can be swayed by escalation of territorial disputes these two allies still have with one another. In that sense, it is hardly surprising that the famous rapport between President George W. Bush and Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi worked to embolden Japanese "nationalists and reactionaries" much to the chagrin of both the South Korean and Chinese leadership (Calder 2008 ).
In the realm of popular sentiment, Korea's on-going historical and territorial disputes with both China and Japan disallows clear cut solidarity with either party, or explicit analogies with the dispute between China and Japan, because both powers are regarded as Northeast and bitter memories of Japan's wartime brutality.While identifying popular suspicion and resentment in Northeast Asia is a confirmatory finding, one issue this article points to that deserves further attention is growing unease about South Korea's delicate balancing act in the face of China's rise. Economically (and culturally) close to China, and quite often at loggerheads with Japan, South Korea's experience of the 1980s-1990s is highly germane to China's ongoing reforms. It is also a U.S. ally whose conduct as a middle power is important to monitor in the context of deteriorating Sino-Japan relations and American rebalancing.
